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Acquisition Theory: The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance

By J.D. Burke
Oct 23, 2015, 14:00 EDTUpdated: Invalid DateTime
There are several different flavours of genius and a different slice lies within each individual. These attributes become increasingly profound and magnified as the beholders are thrust into higher-profile situations – like managing a franchise, for one example.
This made the first campaign under the Canucks brain trust an especially interesting one to watch. Under the prior regime, one could list their genius as being founded in innovation, analytics and an otherworldly understanding of the salary cap and it’s many intricacies. Meanwhile, Benning entered the fray with Vancouver on a clean slate.
The track record indicated talent evaluation came naturally to the rookie manager, but beyond that there was little tangible evidence of what his strengths, weaknesses and wrinkles may be. A season later these wrinkles are making themselves apparent, in the form of an expedited youth movement through the acquisition of high-scoring, further along prospects.
We’ll explore the practical application of this acquisition theory, it’s merits, pitfalls and the like, on the other side of the jump.
Practical
As Benning entered his first season at the helm, cries from the outside for an infusion of youth became almost deafening. A sentiment echoed by then recently departed former head coach, John Tortorella. Benning’s first salvo of moves revealed his strategy to meet these demands post-haste.
This process started by relinquishing Jason Garrison to the Tampa Bay Lightning, in exchange for a second-round selection in the 2014 Draft – pretty craft asset management, if we’re being entirely frank.
The pick helped the Canucks to get younger, as it guaranteed another 18-year old piece would be added to the system. Rather than abiding by the development process, though, the Canucks flipped this selection in exchange for Linden Vey – a 22-year old, NHL-ready player at the time. At the time it looked like a massive process victory, but using the recently developed PCS (Prospect Cohort Success) tool, it appears as though the Canucks increased their chances of getting a bona fide NHL forward by anywhere from 20-30%.
The latter iteration of this strategy came midway through last season, as the Canucks dealt Gustav Forsling to the Chicago Blackhawks in exchange for Adam Clendenning. Forsling was a good and fine prospect in and of himself, but even so, the prospects of getting anything out of a fifth round selection are always slim. Using PCS, it would appear as though Benning executed another 20% swing of probability in the Canucks favour.
Finally, there was the acquisition of Sven Baertschi in the waning moments of the trade deadline. There has been no shortage of digital ink spilled on this medium with regards to that acquisition. Still, none have topped the value assessment made by the estranged, Rhys Jessop, mere moments after the acquisition…
There are definitely some promising CHLers that project to be available around where Vancouver’s 2015 2nd rounder will be, but it’s not really accurate to say that the quality of players available this season in that range is exceptionally different than in years past. In fact, the only forward that should be available in the second round and seems to have a really strong chance at becoming the player Baertschi still could be is Anthony Beauvillier, and other than that, you’re likely looking at a lot of depth and mid-to-low roster guys.
Lost in the Percentages
It’s inarguable that in every instance referenced so far, the Canucks expedited the youth movement in the most sensible and safe way imaginable. They turned three weighted dice rolls into near certain NHL’ers. There’s value in this beyond filling the ranks, to be sure. The more cost controlled players on any one roster the better; especially with the uncertainty surrounding the expansion of the salary cap.
For a contending or soon-to-be relevant side, this acquisition theory can pay massive dividends. That second rounder which lands any of the aforementioned prospects might have value beyond the acquired asset, but in all likelihood, the waiting process is well beyond what a contending team can afford. It’s certainly a better approach than drafting overage players, under the assumption that they’ll be ready for NHL action sooner than most.
If the home run that lands a Jamie Benn in the fifth round, or an Ondrej Palat in the seventh, has already been struck, then the near certainty one can rest on through this process has immense value. For a middling franchise, or one bereft of top of the lineup talent in their prospect pool, considerably less so.
Think of NHL roster construction as the race towards a mansion on the hill. The Canucks are a team on the rise, but they’re no match for the Chicago Blackhawks and their 401K. Turning lottery tickets into social security cheques will help to close the gap, but really, you’re putting a new coat of paint on a basement suite.
Any scout will tell you that the baseline method to approaching player development and a set of reasonable expectations is to set a floor and a ceiling for the subject in question. As players age, the gap between the two closes, until you’re left with a fairly reasonable picture of what their future may hold. An idea that holds serious weight, when taken in the context of a league where players reach their physical peaks between 24-27.
As such, acquiring any fringe NHL’er (no matter their success at other professional levels) is still a considerable yield of ceiling for certainty. Often times, the offered certainty doesn’t expand beyond that of a replacement level player anyways. This has been the case for two of the Canucks three stabs at this, so far. Managing a team almost entirely bereft of top-line talent in the pipes, the perhaps 5% (if that) chance of hitting a home run on these selections is infinitely more valuable than two or three replacement level players. It also allows Benning to showcase what is inarguably his hallmark ability: scouting.
The assumption can easily be made when evaluating the “replacement level qualifier” but players like Clendening and Vey’s hit waivers, or free agency, with alarming frequency. The assets relinquished for these pieces, considerably less so.
In Summation
On the low end of this scale, the best one can hope for is a cost controlled player that performs slightly above replacement level, if that. At the high end (think Baertschi) one can expect to maybe secure a cost-controlled middle of the lineup piece.
For the Vancouver Canucks’ of the league, these are priorities that should rank fairly low on the priorities list. High-end, low-end… both cohorts represent the ancillary pieces contending teams add to provide security against injuries and insulate their top tier talent. These are roles that need filling, but not before the Canucks attend to the lack of game breaking talent on the up and up.
There’s a reason role players hit free agency and franchise players less so. Teams prioritize the latter and guard it closely until cost or age do them part. Surrendering a lottery ticket for the former is moving laterally, for the sake of staying afloat.
I respect the process; I question the application.
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