Earlier in the summer, we attempted to launch a series in which we looked at some key Vancouver Canucks transactions that had occurred five years ago through the lens of hindsight. The series was based on the “Five-Year Oscar Test,” a popular idea suggesting the Academy Awards should really be handed out five years after movies are released so that a more full and true assessment of greatness can be made.

The series never really got off the ground, which is the nature of most summer projects. But the Five-Year Oscar Test is still valid – it, for instance, now tells us that there’s no way Rami Malek’s Freddie Mercury deserved the Best Actor nod over Christian Bale’s Dick Cheney. And a five-year window of reflection still applies quite well to making the final call on hockey transactions.

Which is good, because before this summer wraps up, we really wanted to look back on one more major moment from five years ago. And it’s the big unrestricted free agent (UFA) contract that Tyler Myers signed with the Canucks back on July 1, 2019.

The deal was for a term of five years, covering the 2019/20 season to 2023/24, and it just expired this past offseason. For those five years, Myers earned a total of $30 million, giving him an average annual value (AAV) and cap hit of $6 million. A significant portion of the contract – $16 million, spread out over three payments – was paid out in the form of signing bonuses. The contract included a full no-movement clause in the first year, a full no-trade clause in the next two, and a modified ten-team no-trade clause in the final two.

Five years later, we ask: Was the contract worth its while?

There will be many for whom this is a devastatingly simple answer. That’s because at very few points over the course of this half-decade contract did Myers ever play like a $6 million defender.

It is pretty safe to say that, offensively speaking, the Canucks never got their money’s worth out of Myers. Or, if they did, it wasn’t until the final season of his contract. He was coming off consecutive seasons of 36 and 31 points with Winnipeg when he signed in Vancouver. He dipped right down to 21 points for the Canucks in each of the next two seasons – albeit in a more limited amount of games played – and then was all the way down to 18 points in 82 games for 2021/22.

The offence wouldn’t rebound to Winnipeg levels for Myers until last year when he managed five goals and 29 points in 77 games.

Myers’ defensive contributions, on the other hand…definitely ranged in quality.

Looking at that chart, it doesn’t really quite jive with the narrative that developed around Myers in his own end. By most accounts, Myers was described as a defensive disaster throughout the five-year term.

But a look at the fancy stats will show that, while Myers definitely struggled at times, he mostly kept his head either above water or just below the surface.

For one, Myers’ actual rate of goals for and against always ticked a little ahead of his underlying analytics, meaning he might not have made it look pretty but often got the job done more effectively than he seemed to be doing.

For another, Myers can definitely be looked at as a reflection of the team around him.

When the Canucks lacked defensive structure, Myers lacked defensive structure. When the penalty kill was getting blown up regularly, Myers was getting blown up on the PK.

There are definitely some low points to be found. The 2020/21 season was a real mess for Myers. But there are also some highlights to be found.

Some will remember the performance Myers put on in the 2020 bubble playoffs, where he returned from injury to take a million minor penalties but also to effectively shut down some key sizeable opposition talent like Alex Tuch.

Then there’s this past season, where head coach Rick Tocchet and Co. really managed to settle down and simplify Myers, leading to perhaps the best defensive campaign of his career.

No one will argue that Myers brought $6 million in defensive value for the bulk of his contract. Too often, it was strongly to the contrary, and those massive gaffes still stand out in the memory of many. But it is arguable that, at times, Myers did provide that value, and it tended to be when the team needed it most.

Which brings us to the topic of deployment:

If there’s one thing Myers did consistently for the Canucks over the full five years of his term, it was eat minutes.

The only year in which Myers did not rank in the top three of average ice time in Vancouver – or average fewer than 20 minutes per night – was this past season. And in that case, Myers still ranked third on the blueline; he just lost his place to Elias Pettersson and JT Miller.

In terms of quality of competition, the same holds true – in every season save for 2023/24, Myers faced either the toughest or the second-toughest overall opposition during his deployment.

He ate minutes, he ate a lot of minutes, and he ate a lot of difficult minutes, at that.

If we look at the entire five-year term, we find Myers having played a grand total of 7,568 minutes, which ranks behind just Quinn Hughes’ 8,710 minutes for the Canucks over the same span.

Leaguewide, Myers’ 7,568 minutes are the 35^th most of any NHL defender over those same five years. But did that make him worth $6 million a year?

Here, we have to get into supply and demand.

When Myers signed that contract in the summer of 2019, he became one of 20 NHL defenders paid an AAV of $6 million or greater.

Was Myers ever a top-20 defender in the NHL during his time in Vancouver? No, he was not.

By 2023/24, Myers was one of more than 50 NHL defenders with a cap hit of $6 million or more. Was he ever a top-50 defender in the NHL during his time in Vancouver? Now, we might be getting closer to the truth.

Other, better defenders signed similar or even cheaper contracts during these five years, it’s true. But there’s no telling whether or not those players would have signed those contracts in Vancouver. Myers was ready and willing to join the Canucks, and try as they might, they only really ever managed to add one other blueliner capable of handling more responsibilities during Myers’ entire tenure, that being Filip Hronek.

There’s a real sense here that Myers was perhaps the best option the Canucks had available at the time and continued to be so for most of his contract.

And what did they get out of it? Precious few meaningful wins, and only two playoff appearances. But, also, the development of the franchise’s first true superstar defenseman in Hughes, as well as the development of a strong forward corps and a Vezina-nominated goaltender in Thatcher Demko.

How much of that is attributable to the stabilizing presence of Myers from 2019 to present? It’s impossible to know. But given his off-ice reputation, it’s safe to say he played at least some role in fostering the youth wave that has now taken over the team.

We can run ourselves through a series of questions here at the end to see where we really fall.

Did Myers deliver $30 million worth of value during his contract? No, probably not.

Was it a good contract by most measures? Not really.

Was it a good contract by the standards of July 1 UFA deals? Now, we’re getting closer to the truth. UFAs always get overpaid, and RHD UFAs more than anyone.

But, perhaps most importantly, was the Myers contract one that the Canucks regret? Or one that they look back on and can be glad they signed?

Given Myers’ importance to the team over those five years, to where they’ve arrived at now, and his continued role on the team, we have to conclude that – despite the up-and-down nature of his performance – the Myers contract was not a regrettable one. Five years later, we can state pretty plainly that the Canucks weren’t going to spend his cap hit on anything particularly meaningful during that time, anyway.

And now, heading into 2024/25, the Canucks have developed a strong core and are ready to compete with Myers locked in at a lesser but still effective role – at half his previous cap hit.

Many predicted on July 1, 2019, that the Canucks would come to rue the day they signed Tyler Myers. We can now look back five years later and say those folks were wrong.