The Canucks took their second waltz into the trade deadline dance yesterday, acquiring the rights to Philip Larsen from the Edmonton Oilers in exchange for a conditional fifth-round selection. That pick can go as high as the fourth round, depending on Larsen’s ability to meet certain production thresholds.

This acquisition aligns closely with the stated goal of Canucks general manager, Jim Benning, heading into the February 29th trade deadline. It’s neither a seller nor buyers move, but another percentage bump on an in-house asset. If nothing else, it’s a band-aid over the club’s short-term deficiencies on the back end of their prospect stable.

It’s hard to say what the Canucks have lost or gained in this trade. We’re likely four or five years from knowing who, or what, the Canucks relinquished when they took on the Philip Larsen rehabilitation tour. We can place a value on the asset at hand though and it’s worth questioning whether it was worth the trouble of giving it up for Larsen’s second tour of duty. 

Losing a fifth (or fourth) round selection is never a big deal in the grand scheme of things. Depending on where you look, a pick in that section of the draft yields an NHL player one out of every ten shots. An impactful NHL player, considerably less often.

That’s not to say either round is a barren wasteland, either. In the hands of a savvy enough draftee, the fourth round can yield the odd difference maker. Ideally, though, you further your chances of landing this piece by volume.Take enough shots in the dark and eventually you’ll hit. 

By dealing away a fifth (or fourth) round pick, the Canucks have taken another bullet out of the chamber. That brings the Canucks to just seven picks in this year’s draft. Contrast that with the twelve picks the Toronto Maple Leafs hold in this upcoming draft and ask yourself which is leaving the table with more future NHL’ers.

The best aspect to a draft pick though is the age of the piece introduced to your system. I’ve often found that as players advance out of their teens, so to do they advance away from the large spectrum of possibilities for what they can or cannot be. There’s value in being able to look at an eighteen-year-old and wonder if he can hit beyond his expected value. 

Larsen last saw action in the NHL during the 2013-14 season, suiting up for 30-games with the Edmonton Oilers. The Oilers used Larsen sparingly, playing him just under 14-minutes at even strength on a per-game basis. Although they were reticent to use Larsen in high leverage situations at evens, they showed no such hesitation on the power play, where they used Larsen the third most of any defenceman – second most on a per-game basis.

A cursory glance at Stephen Burtch’s dCorsi metric (which takes into account usage, linemates, team effects, etc. to draw a player’s observed Corsi against expected for delta results) shows that Larsen struggled mightily in his last NHL stay. What was especially interesting was where Larsen was underperforming expected results. Larsen’s -21.38 dCFImpact indicates that the Oilers grossly underperformed expected shot generation levels when he was on the ice.

That’s just one facet to a disturbing downwards trend from the perspective of puck possession, which followed Larsen from Dallas all the way to the press box in Edmonton. Sampling issues are the likely culprit for Larsen’s 55.6% and 52.5% Corsi For showings in his two seasons of NHL action – a grand total of eight games. The precipitous drop thereafter, from 50.8% to 45.8% and finally 42.6% reveals indicates Larsen’s been hanging on for dear life ever since cracking the NHL in something resembling a full-time capacity.

It’s worth noting that Larsen performed exceedingly well as a puck mover in Edmonton though. According to Corey Sznajder’s manually tracked zone exit data for the 2013-14 season, Larsen was a full four points above the team average for defencemen by Successful Exit%. 

That was two years ago, though, and while it bears mentioning and taking it account, the issue at hand is what player the Canucks can hope to bring in the fold next season. Frankly, it’s hard to say. Larsen’s showing in two full seasons in the KHL are impressive, to say the least. 

Larsen is fifth among KHL defencemen by points scored, with games in hand on the four players above him. It was hard not to wonder if fluctuating percentages were responsible (a la Steve Moses) but Larsen’s shooting at just above 5%. Everything is relative and I’ve no idea whether that’s exceptionally high or low by KHL standards, but it’s a reasonable number for an NHL defenceman to hit on. 

KHL data sets are notoriously limited and, unfortunately, there’s no underlying data to help us draw conclusions. Based on everything we do know, though, it’s more likely Larsen has turned a corner than not. What remains to be seen is how far he’s made it thereafter.

The Canucks gained something from this trade. That much isn’t up for debate. How much they’ve gained is a relative unknown, although, we have as many reasons to temper our expectations as we do bolster them. On the one hand, Larsen’s NHL career suggests that he’s no better than a third-pairing defender that can chip on the power play. In the two years since his offensive production is such that there’s been a marked improvement to his game. Offensively, at the very least.

But a player entering his physical peak, just improving on being a third pair defender, is still just a good third pairing defender. Maybe you go as high to suggest that he’s a viable fourth defender. Those players are a dime a dozen. Think about some of the defencemen signed to affordable contracts this summer to play that role. David Schlemko, John Moore, Matt Bartkowski, Matt Irwin, Christian Ehrhoff, Mark Barberio, Marek Zidlicky, etc.

If you’re noticing a recurring theme in the players I’ve highlighted, it’s that they’re the filler which you augment a contending roster with. The Canucks should not be in the business of surrendering futures for complimentary pieces. That’s exactly what they’ve done by acquiring Larsen.

Let’s say that the fifth (or fourth) round pick has a 1% chance of developing into a core player. That 1% swing in the dark is more valuable to a team looking for the next wave of top of the lineup talent than a depth player. The Canucks are run by a master scout and gave up another play in the draft. For their troubles, they’ve landed a player they likely could’ve bought in free agency for pennies on the dollar.

It’s fascinating that a team relying so mightily on the ability of its brain trust to evaluate talent does so poorly at evaluating the market. The Canucks could have their cake and eat it too here. They really could have.