As the video I’ve posted above might indicate, the 2014-15 season started with such promise for the undersized pivot. With a strong pre-season and an impressive AHL track record, the expectation was that Vey could push Nick Bonino for the second-line center spot from training camp. Vey fell short of meeting these expectations, but managed to carve out a role for himself early as a moving part within the Canucks bottom-nine forwards. Willie Desjardins also gave Vey every opportunity to prove his worth as the floater in the Canucks 1-3-1 power play set up, roaming in the slot to create passing lanes.

The Canucks reaped early results going to this well, as Vey potted three power play goals in the month of October alone, to go with two assists at even strength. Five points in any given month for a depth forward is encouraging in and of itself, but given that this was Vey’s first spat of full-time duty in the NHL it was doubly impressive. Vey carried this production into his next month of play, but it was primarily driven by results at even strength – save for one power play marker. Not long after, though, Vey’s effectiveness tailed off considerably.

Vancouver’s power play began to stagnate and on a personal level no forward seemed to embody these struggles more regularly than Vey. At best, Vey was a complete non-factor; at his absolute worst, Vey became a redundancy to the point where opposing defenders were content to all but ignore him. And this speaks only to his performance on the power play, where the cards are stacked heavily in his favour. 

What this might be representative of is a misinterpretation of Vey’s skill-set on the part of everyone involved. When the offensive scheme stopped catering to Vey’s unique offensive traits, his ability to contribute began to atrophy. He flashed ability, but never long enough to warrant an extended look in the Canucks top-six. 

And while the noise became almost deafening regarding Vey’s inability to move the needle and contribute offensively, he was rounding out into an serviceable defensive forward. Pass it to Bulis did an excellent job uncovering this, using Brad Richardson as a comparable for Vey where defensive play was concerned. Vey outperformed Richardson from their own zone, to the shock of almost everyone. 

This claim is backed up by Richardson’s performance by dCorsi – a metric which takes into account usage, linemates, team effects, etc. to draw a composite score against expected results. With a dCFimpact of -49.39, Vey greatly under-performed his expected results offensively. Meanwhile, his dCAimpact of 7.51 indicates he slightly outperformed expected results at suppressing shot attempts. 

All the same, it wasn’t the best of campaigns for Vey. As many suspected in the lead-up to this season, Vey appeared too small to compete in the Western Conference as a center. Physically, Vey was no match for the sturdier centers of the Pacific Division. 

By counting stats, Vey actually had a fairly respectable season for a rookie pivot in the Western Conference. 24-points is in line with what one might expect from a passable third line forward, so he passes the smell test in that regard. The most concerning blip here is the paltry 61-shots in 75 contests. Meager, especially given the power play time et al.

Not the most encouraging of possession numbers. By that same token, Vey’s most common linemate at even strength was Derek Dorsett – not exactly a territorial force himself last season. Surrendering just 54.8 CA/60, Vey had a relatively strong showing as an attempt suppressor, but simply couldn’t get the needle moving in the other direction.

The goal-based underlying data shines a slightly less favourable light on Vey, who posted an ugly GF%Rel of -5.6%. Again though, these dissatisfying results are driven largely by an inability to generate offense rather than suppress it. Vey’s GA/60 of 2.4 has him ranked relatively high among Canuck forwards.

The scoring chance data aligns closely with Vey’s possession results. Pretty middling results from the perspective of generation and suppression, combining for a pretty uninspiring mark on the total.

Vey does a slightly better job preventing ten-bell chances than normal ones. Again, though, pretty middling results on the whole.

The underlying shot data isn’t a good look for Vey. The Canucks performed considerably better without Vey than with, as per the SF%Rel of -4.7%. This is due in large to Vey’s inability to help facilitate any sort of shot volume towards the oppositions net. 

No two 24-point campaigns are the same. I’d leave last season with a better taste in my mouth, were the majority of those points accrued in the final months; whereas in this case, about half of them were potted in the first two. What the former indicated, was a significant step backwards for Vey as the season wore on. This is especially true given the ample opportunities provided to Vey.

Going into next season, I imagine the leash will be considerably shorter on Vey – history with the Medicine Hat Tigers, or otherwise. From the Canucks perspective, they will need to seriously consider how they aim to develop Vey. Assuming the pieces on the team remain constant, Vey is currently slated to center the Canucks fourth-line between Derek Dorsett and Brandon Prust. This line has the potential to provide defensive upside, should Vey develop a stronger neutral zone game to allow for transitioning play. 

This is a role that Vey could grow into, but the undersized center will have to become a much more imposing force physically for him to reach his potential from this slot. This doesn’t necessarily mean throwing his body around regularly, but just winning the odd puck battle. Dorsett and Prust provide more than enough muscle for any line, but the center does most of the defensive lifting on any line and for Vey to maximize his effectiveness in this role, he will have to start winning more battles and getting the puck moving up ice.

Last season was far from encouraging, but there’s just enough there to suggest that Vey might have some upside if used in the right role.